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THE STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF CONTRACT IN THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S'LIABILITY ACT.
Since the federal government and most of the states have en-
acted Employer's Liability Acts, it becomes important to knbw
to what extent the employer's liability is lessened or modified
when the employer provides a relief department which pays a
certain benefit to the employee when he is injured or killed in
the course of his employment.
Of course, the employer's liability in such cases depends greatly
on the wording of the particular statute, yet the case of Mc-
Namara v. The Washington Terminal Co., Wash. Law Rep.,
Vol. 38, No. 22, p. 343, is of particular interest, in that it estab-
lished, in the interest of railway employees, the constitutionality of
such a clause in an act which provides: "That no contract of
employment, insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity for injury or
death, entered into by or on behalf of an employee, nor the ac-
ceptance of any such insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity by
the person entitled thereto, shall constitute any bar or defense to
an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries to or
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death of such employee; provided, however, that upon the trial
of such action against any common carrier the defendant may
set off therein any sum it has contributed toward any such in-
surance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to
the injured employee, or in case of his death to his personal rep-
resentatives."
The right of contract is involved in all such cases as this, but
that restrictions may be placed on such right in the interest of the
general public, or for the preservation of the public health, morals
or safety, is unquestioned. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366;
Paterson v. Bark Endora, i90 U. S., 169.
Statutes abolishing the fellow servant's rule in the interest of
railway employees are not unconstitutional. Herrick v. Railroad,
31 Minn., Ii; Railroad v. Mackey, 127 U. S., 205. It has also
been settled by many adjudications that where a railway com-
pany maintains a relief department and the company contributes
toward the relief fund, the injured employee has an election,
either to accept the benefit afforded by the relief department, or to
maintain his action against the company for the injuries sus-
tained; but if he accepts the benefit from the relief department
after his cause of action arises, he is estopped from bringing an
action against the company for damages. Johnson v. Railroad
Co., 163 Pa. St., 127; Hamilton v. St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co.,
118 Fed., 92. The courts hold that this is not a contract exempt-
ing the company from future negligence, as the cause of action
has already arisen. Neither is it against public policy, as the
acceptance by the employee of the benefit of the contract, so far
from securing to the employer immunity from liability for dam-
ages sustained by reason of his own negligence or that of his
servants and agents, in fact, gives to the employee a certainty of
some compensation, whether the injury was caused by the em-
ployer's negligence or not, with the option" of the employee of
pursuing his ordinary legal remedy if he elects to do so, instead of
receiving the benefit which his contract affords. Johnson v. Rail-
road Co., supra.
But a statute which provides that the acceptance by the em-
ployee of the benefit of the contract shall not estop him from
recovering damages, notwithstanding he may have given a re-
lease, has been" held to be unconstitutional. Sturjess v. At. Coast
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Line R. R., 8o S. C., 167; At. Coast Line Co. v. Dunning, x66
Fed., 8so. The courts so hold on the ground above given, that the
acceptance of the benefit of such a contract is not against public
policy, but is for the benefit of the injured employee, and a
statute which attempts to take away this right of contract is un-
constitutional.
As has been stated, the principal case sustained the validity of
a statute which took away this right of contract; but the federal
statute in that case contained a provision that the common carrier
should have the right of set-off of any sum it had contributed to-
ward the relief fund, and thus the court distinguished it from
the above cases where the employee has the right of election, but
is estopped from bringing an action for damages if he elects to
accept- the benefit.
It seems, on principle, that the case was correctly decided.
Congress has the constitutional power to make the carrier respon-
sible to employees for injuries sustained through its negligence
or the negligence of its servants and agents. Railroad v. Mackey,
,supra; and where Congress acting within its constittitional
powers, provides a right or confers a benefit which did not before
exist, it may also provide that no contract by which that right of
benefit may be waived shall be of any validity. McGuire v.
Railway, 131 Ia., 340.
As experience shows, the employee in the time of injury is not
on an equal footing with the employer to contract, and often from
dire necessity, he is forced to release his right of action against
the company in order to receive the benefit afforded by the relief
fund. The working of this statute does not bring hardship upon
the employer as he is entitled to set-off all he has contributed to-
ward the fund, and thus is not subjected to pay tvice for the
same injury.
It must also be remembered, in passing upon the validity of
such a statute, that a corporation is a creature of the State, and,
therefore, its right to contract is subject to be regulated and re-
Stricted by its creator, as the power to create necessarily implies
the power to regulate. Railroad v. Bristol, 15I U. S., 556; Rail-
road v. Matthews, 174 U. S., 96.
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ATTORNEY'S SALE OF RIGHT TO USE 
NAME GROUND FOR DISCIPLINE.
That an attorney has no right to sell the use 
of his name as
such, and that such action constitutes professional 
misconduct
calling for the discipline of the court is the result 
of a recent de-
cision of the Appellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court
in the case of In re Rothschild reported in 
the Nezw York Law
Journal, Vol. XLIV, No. 41. The respondent 
in this case gave a
furniture company a power of attorney to 
sign his name without
limitation to threatening letters to creditors 
and thus hasten their
collection. In view of the fact that the present 
instance was the
first in which the court had been called to 
pass upon such an
offence, the guilty attorney's punishment was 
fixed at suspension
from active practice for one year.
There is no doubt, inasmuch as attorneys 
are but officers
of the court, as has been universally decided 
by the courts of
this country in a vast number of cases, 
among which are the
leading cases of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 
(U. S.), 333, and In
re Cooper, 22 N. Y., 67, that professional misconduct 
or neglect
of duty as an attorney is good ground for 
suspension or disbar-
ment. Such is the general doctrine as laid down in In 
re Kirby,
84 Fed., 6o6, and in New York Bank v. 
Stryker, I Wheeler Crim.
Cases (N. Y.), 330.
In the case of In re Kirby, supra, one Kirby 
was convicted of
having in his possession certain governmental 
stamps which he
knew to be stolen. Although this act was not 
a felony, Congress
had attached to it an infamous punishment. 
The court in passing
judgment, quoting from Ex parte Wall, 1o7 
U. S., 265, 273, said:
"rt is laid down in all the books in which the 
subject is treated
that a court has power to exercise a summary 
jurisdiction over its
attorneys to compel them to act honestly towards 
their clients and
to punish them by fine and imprisonment 
for misconduct and
contempt and, in gross cases of misconduct, 
to strike their names
from the roll."
So in the case of the New York Bank v. Stryker, 
supra, where
the respondent was convicted of fraudulently 
issuing a check, it
was said:
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"If an attorney, solicitor or counsellor acts wrongfully or dis-
honestly in his office as such, he is answerable, and may be pun-
ished by the loss of his office."
But the question naturally arises: When is an attorney guilty
of professional misconduct?
In the majority of the states of the country, statutes have been
passed defining what constitutes such professional misconduct as
will warrant the court in acting. But whether these statutes con-
clude the court from exercising its general power and thus pun-
ishing guilty attorneys for other than statutory causes is a mooted
question, to which the weight of authority in this country is
opposed. Such is the ruling in E.R parte Wall, supra, and In re
Boone, 83 Fed.. 944.
In the former case, one Wall was convicted of engaging in an
unlawful and riotous gathering, which broke into the county
jail in Hillsborough County, Florida, took therefrom, by force, a
prisoner and hanged him to a tree nearby. The United States
Supreme Court decided that this was sufficient cause for disbar-
ment in as much as the defendant thereby, showed such an utter
disregard and contempt for the law, which as a sworn attorney he
was bound to support, as to totally unfit him for his position, and
this, despite the fact that there was no" positive statute calling for
the exercise of the court's jurisdiction.
And likewise, the Federal Court in the case of In re Boone,
supra, held that its right to discipline the attorneys practicing in
its court remained unabridged by any statute.
But there is some authority opposed to this doctrine, the courts
of Indiana and North Dakota holding that the right of disbar-
ment is governed exclusively by statute. Thus, in the case of
Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind., 47, where the defendant was found
guilty of contempt of court, it was held that he could only be
disbarred from practice by proceedings, which were regulated by
statute, and not by any summary process of the court.
An even stricter rule was laid down and adhered to by the
North Dakota courts in the case of In re Eaton, 4 N. D., 514,
in which it was held that, where a statute enumerates grounds for
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the disbarment of an attorney, no other grounds can be considered
by the court. In this case, one Eaton made a false statement 
to
another attorney in the presence of the court; he also 
innocently
carried away a paper from the'files of -the court and destroyed 
it.
In as much as there was no express provision in the statute 
of dis-
barment covering these acts, the court held that it 
could not act.
The New York Court, however, in the principal case, 
has shown
no hesitancy in accepting the doctrine of the United 
States Su-
preme and Circuit Courts and holds that it has jurisdiction 
in such
cases even without an award of jurisdiction by a positive 
statutory
enactment. And in as much as the attorneys are 
but officers of the
court, it seems no more than just that the courts 
should be al-
lowed to regulate the actions of their officers.
A.rthur Rothschild, the respondent in this case, 
executed a
power of attorney to the Empire Furniture. Co., 
allowing two
employees of that company to use his name, unrestrained, 
upon
all matters pertaining to the collection of the furniture 
company's
outstanding bills. This power of attorney was 
for one year and
in return for the use of his name, the respondent 
received one
hundred dollars worth of furniture.
Justice Ingraham, in rendering the judgment, suspending 
the
attorney for one year, said:
"We think it inconsistent with the performance 
of the duties
assumed by an attorney when he accepts his 
office, to sell the
right to use his name as an attorney; and 
to enter any arrange-
ment by which others, who are not directly connected 
in business
with him as partners or clerks are authorized 
to sign letters in
his name or to use his name in the transaction 
of their business,
is a serious violation of an attorney's duty 
to the State and is
serious professional misconduct."
However, after considering the opinion of 
Judge Ingraham,
there seems to be no debatable ground upon 
which the decision
can be attacked. The attorney receives his title 
as such only
because he is possessed of special mental attainments peculiar to
the law, and these, it is expected, will be upheld 
by him while in
practice. They cannot be upheld by an unprofessional 
appointee
of his and any attempt on his part to vest these 
appointees with
the power, which is coincident to his title, is certainly 
without the
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spirit of good faith, which the members of the bar were justified
in expecting of the respondent when they admitted him to prac-
tice.
THE ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
The defendant in People v. Dunnigan, 128 N. E., i8o (Mich.),
was convicted of murder. The record discloses the fact that while
defendant was in custody charged with some petty offense, one
W. was admitted to his cell and in the course of a conversation,
sugested that if the defendant wished to communicate with his
wife that he, W., would deliver the message. Thereupon the de-
fendant addressed a letter to his wife in which he used language
that was construed as a confession of guilt in committing the
homicide. W., instead of delivering the letter to the defendant's
wife, surrendered it to the sheriff, who used it in evidence against
the defendant. It was held that such a self-incriminating letter
written by accused and sent to his wife, but not received by her,
being intercepted by the sheriff, is not privileged within the
statute which prohibits examination of spouses respecting com-
munications between them.
Mr. Wigmore, in his treatise on Evidence, says, that the his-
tory of the privilege of communication between husband and
wife is involved in a tantalizing obscurity. It was understood to
exist in some shape before the end of the sixteenth century, and
was firmly established by the latter part of the seventeenth cen-
tury. So this principle, hitherto existing rather in principle than
in rule, practically begins its existence and is defined in terms by
the legislation of that period. Wigmore on Evidenice, Sec. 2333.
The earliest reported case in point is Lady Ivy's Case, io How.
St. R., 555 (1684), which held that a husband will not be per-
mitted to testify to communications from his wife.
It is difficult to distinguish the development of the privileged
communication rule as to husband and wife, from that of the
rule of the disqualification of either spouse as a witness. The
earliest mention of the latter rule is found in an Anonymous
Case, i B. & G., 47 (1651), which held that a wife would not
be permitted to testify against her husband. The court said in
YALE LAW JOURNAL
King v. Cliviger, 2. D. & E., 263 (1788), that a wife shall not be
called to give evidence even tending to criminate her husband.
She cannot be a witness either for or against him. She cannot
testify for him because their interests are identical, and she can-
not testify against him because it is against the policy of the law.
The same was held in O'Connor v. Marforibanks, 4 M. & G., 435
(1842), and it is now a firmly established rule both in England
and in the United States. Most states have statutes prohibiting
the examination of either spouse in regard to communications be-
tween them during the existence of the marital relation.
The courts universally hold that the preservation of the sacred-
ness and confidence of the matrimonial relation, being a matter
of public policy, the disclosure by either spouse of the confiden-
tial communications between them, should be prohibited. There
is some conflict upon the application of that rule when such com-
munication is in the form of a letter and 'that letter is in the
hands of a third person.
There are two distinct lines of decisions; one holding that the
communication is in itself inherently privileged and that the
privilege can be waived only by the writer. Mercer v. State, 4o
Fla., 216; Scott v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky., 5II; Wilkerson v.
State, 91 Ga., 729; Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich., 152; Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 8o Tex., IO1 ; Seldcn v. State, 74 Wis., 271.
Mercer v. State, supra, holdz that the communication is privi-
leged regardless of how the third party came into its possession.
The court in Scott v. Com., supra, said that a letter from a hus-
band to his wife cannot under any circumstances be used in evi-
dence. In the language of Maynard v. Vinton, supra, the privi-
lege is the privilege of the person making the communication and
can be waived only by him personally. This rule rests upon public
policy and the seal which the law has fixed upon communications
between husband and wife during the existence of the marital
relation. It remains forever, unless removed by both parties.
The rule is followed by Derham v. Derham, 125 Mich., 109.
On the other hand, what seems to be the weight of authority is
found in the cases which follow i Greenleaf Evid., Sec. 254 (a),
which is as follows: Though papers and other subjects of evidence
may have been illegally taken from the possession of the party
against whom they are offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained,
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this is no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent
to the issue. This court will not take notice of how they were
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an
issue to determine the question.
In State v. Bufington, 2o Kan., 599, the defendant's wife had
voluntarily surrendered the letter from the defendant to the prose-
cuting witness and the court said that as' the letter is now in
the custody and control of a third person, it is admissible in evi-
dence. The same was held in State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn., 518;
State v. Hayes, i4o N. Y., 484; State v. Ulrich, IIO Mo., 350.
The tendency of the privilege is to prevent the full disclosure of
the truth and it is therefore to be strictly construed. Lloyd v.
Pennie, 50 Fed., 4.
The judge refused to admit the letters in evidence because of
the peculiar facts in the particular case in Bowman v. Patric,
32 Fed., 368.
There is no question but that the defendant in the present case
intended the letter as a confidential communication to his wife
and that this evidence was obtained by a culpable breach of the
confidence reposed in W., and also in the collusion of the sheriff.
Therefore, as this method of obtaining a conviction is most
reprehensible and is plainly calculated to discourage and even de-
stroy the sacred confidences of the matrimonial state, it seems that
the interests of public policy demand that the court take cog-
nizance of the facts that were before it and, following Bowman v.
Patrich, supra, exclude the evidence.
INFANT'S RIGHT TO DAMAGES FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY ELECTRIFIED
THIRD RAIL.
As a power conductor, the electric third rail is in many cases
the most practicable, and under certain conditions, the only possi-
ble method of operating trains open to modern transportation
lines. These rails invariably carry a powerful current, usually
alternating, and because complete insulation would render them
entirely useless, they constitute in their position on the ground
and similarity to common road rails a menace to life, calling for
peculiar precautions and safeguards, not demanded from owners
of ordinary property.
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In the case of Riedel v. West Jersey and S. R. Co., 177 Fed.,
374, the defendant company was held not liable for injuries sus,
tained by a child, who in a suit by his father as next friend,
based a claim on the alleged negligence of the company. The
company in this case legally operated its line by means of power
conveyed through an uncovered third rail, having its right of
way securely fenced against intruders. The plaintiff, an eight-
year-old infant, pulled a bolt from the fence and thus opened a
way into the defendant's premises, where, in the capacity of a tres-
passer, he sustained.the injuries complained of. The court found
the, defendant to have taken all necessary precautions to safe-
guard the public and to have been without negligence in any par-
ticular. Judgment was consequently. entered for the defendant
company.
The case of McAllister v. Jung, reported in 122 Ill. App., 138,
involving questions similar to those found in the principal case
above, and preceding it in point of time, was decided in favor of
the defendant company. In this case, the plaintiff, a thirteen-
year-old boy, climbed the vertical supporting trusses of an ele-
vated railroad in search of a lost ball, and was injured upon the
third rail at the top of the structure. Stress was laid by the court
upon the fact that the very construction of the elevated road was
in itself not only a notice and warning that no one should go
upon it, but also a practical method employed by the company to
render acess by the public almost impossible, and although the
very danger to be thus incurred, or a child's predilection to climb,
might induce a trespasser to venture upon the structure, the com-
pany could not thereby be held as negligent when the trespasser
was injured.
The court laid down as a proposition of law in Suttons v. West
Jersey R. Co., 73 Atl. (N. J.), 256, that a company is not under
any obligation to an intentional trespasser, except that no wilful
injury shall be done him, and as a consequence the defendant com-
pany in this case could not be held liable as negligent where the
deceased, a boy of thirteen years, had left a public highway and
trespassed upon the defendant's well-fenced third rail track.
In the only other third rail case which reached a court of last
resort, the defendant company, under the circumstances, was
held liable. In this case, Anderson v. Seattle & Tacoma Inter-
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urban R. R. Co., 36 Wash., 387, the plaintiff was wrongfully
ejected from one of the deftndant's cars, and as a result, in-
jured by falling upon a third rail. The case may be distinguished
from those preceding it, in that the plaintiff here was an adult, and
not a trespasser.
Granting that the owner of property, upon which is so danger-
ous an instrumentality as a highly electrified third rail, may be
held to an extraordinarily high degree of care in protecting the
public, it would seem that the rule of reasonable care must govern,
and that when, in the opinion of the court, such care has been ex-
ercised, actual negligence must be proven to render him liable
for injuries sustained by reason of such third raiL "Reason-
able care does not require such precautions as will absolutely pre-
vent injuries or render injuries impossible." Sjogrens Hall, 53
Mich., 274.
It is also a fundamental legal proposition, that trespassers do
not have such rights upon property of others as may be neces-
sarily due those of the public who are on such property by right,
of the owner's permission. "One is under no duty, as to a mere
trespasser, to keep his premises in safe condition, even though
the trespasser be an infant."- Frost v. Eaftern R. R. Co., 64 N.
H., 220; Hortenstine v. Va. & Carolina R. R. Co., io2 Va., 914.
"Third rail" cases may be clearly distinguished from the
"spring gun" cases, in that the third rails are placed upon prop-
erty for a specific economic purpose, not even incidentally induced
by malicious motives looking toward an intentional injury to-tres-
passers.
A review of cases in point, -and of those analogous, indicates
that, where the degree of care exercised by the owner of property
is commensurate with the dangerous character of instrumentali-
ties thereon, trespassers, even though infants, will not be allowed
damages for injuries caused by such instrumentalities.
APPROPRIATION OF A RAILROAD'S RIGHT OF WAY FOR ANOTHER USE.
In the case of the Portland Railway, Light & Power Co. v.
City of Portland, 181 Fed., 832, it was held that where a city has
only general charter powers to open, lay out, and establish streets,
and to condemn property therefor, it has no authority to condemn
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a part of a railroad's right of way in order to construct a street
parallel with the same.
As a general rule, of course, property cannot be appropriated
for two uses. A city has by its inherent power right to, condemn
certain lands for public use and such pqwer may be conferred
by operation of general laws and judicial tribunals. As to what
is the proper and legal meaning of a public use two theories
have been advanced. The one, that for a public use to exist there
must be a literal use or right to use on the part of the public,
generally without the payment of compensation therefor. While
the other theory holds that a public use means a public benefit,
utility or advantage and one not limited by actual use by the
public in the property. The generally accepted view is that the
latter theory is correct.
In Bachus v. Lehanan, ii N. H., i9, it was held that the right
of a city to condemn for public use must be conferred by general
laws or by judicial tribunals. But when it comes to a city con-
demning one use for another, such authority must be specifically
conferred. This principle is laid down emphatically in Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Faribault, 23 Minn., x67, and is reiterated
in Appeal of Tyrane Township SchoqI District, 15 Atl. (Pa.),
667, where it was held that a municipality has no authority to lay
a street over grounds acquired by a railroad company. In the
case of New Jersey Southern Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 39
N. J. L., 28, this principle was also recognized. Lewis on Eminent
Domain, Sec. 266, holds with numerous authorities that a part
of a railway right of way may not be taken longitudinally nor
can any interference be made with the railway right-of-way.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Town of Lake, 71 Ill., 333.
There is, however, an exception to the general rule, where the
second use does nothing to diminish or damage the prior use,
and in many cases the courts have ruled accoiding to this ex-
ception. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain is con-
tinuing and inextinguishable, and if the public good requires it,
all property is subject to its exercise, and a second appropriation
may be made where it is not inconsistent with the first and does
not tend to deprive the first person acquiring it of his rights. The
South Carolina Railroad Co. v. Steiner, 44 Ga., 546. In con-
demning property for a second use the circumstances and sur-
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rounding conditions, as well as the needs of the community must
be reckoned with. The relative importance and necessities of the
two uses must be weighed, together with the extent of harm
done. Certainly no municipality acting under general powers
could lay out a highway through a public reservoir so as to ruin
it; In re Boston & Albany Ry., 53 N. Y., 574; yet, on the other
hand, if a tract of land held for public purposes was so broad that
it was impracticable to go around it, even though it could not
be crossed without some serious harm, it might be held lawful
for the way to cross it. Wood v. Macon & Brunswick, 68 Ga.,
539. In re Boston and Albany R. R., supra.
The Federal Court in the Oregon Short Line Ry. Co. v. Postal
Telegraph Cable Co., iii Fed., 845, lays down a rule which is
extremely broad in giving a city the power of condemnation.
There it was held that property already dedicated to a public use
stands upon the same footing as other property and is subject to
condemnation as is other property, provided the second use shall
not interfere with the first use. This principle is also laid down
in the case of the Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co. v. Chi-
cago, Minnesota, St. Paul Ry. Co., 76 Minn., 334.
Thus it seems to be a well settled principle that a general
charter does not confer power on a municipality to convert part
of one use to another use, and further that the legislative intent
must appear by express words or necessary implication. Such
implication never arises except as a necessary condition to bene-
ficial enjoyment and efficient exercise of power granted and then
only to the extent of necessity. Hicok V. Hine, 23 Ohio, 523.
A city's right to exercise a power of eminent domain rests
upon the operation of constitutional provisions, the restriction of
agencies selected for the exercise of the power and the question
of public use. These all operate as a limitation upon the exer-
cise of the power. The right of a city to condemn for a second
use is limited to the taking of a portion of a crossing only and
does not extend to the appropriation of an entire tract. Through
necessity, in extreme cases, there may be an appropriation of one
use for another, as in the case of a public street crossing a railroad
track. This is implied by general authority conferred upon cities
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without express provision upon the subject. Little Miami Ry. Co.
v. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio St., 5io.
It seems that from the preponderance of cases noted the general
inclination is not to allow oie use to be condemned in part for
another use. At the same time, should the second use not en-
danger or destroy the first one, and public convenience demand it,
then there may be an appropriation for a second use.
PRIORITY OF RIGHT BETWEEN UNRECORDED TRANSFEREE OF COR-
PORATE STOCK, AND ATTACHING CREDITOR.
In this age of rapid development of business through the means
of corporate organization, and the ever-increasing issue and sale
of corporate stock, the very interesting question presents itself
as to the priority of right between an unrecorded transferee of
corporate stocks and an attaching creditor of the transferor.
This question arose in the case of State Banking Co. v. Taylor,
127 N. W., 59o. The statutes of South Dakota (Sections 423 and
445) provide that "transfers of stock shall not be valid except as
between the parties thereto, until the same are entered on the
books of the corporation; and such books shall be kept open for
the benefit of any stockholder, member or creditor." Under
these circumstances the court held that "notwithstanding such
statutory requirements, the rights of a tranferee of corporate
stocks, though the transfer is not entered on the stock books, is
superior to that of a subsequent attaching creditor of the trans-
feror, whether the creditor had notice of the transfer or not."
The courts in the different states are in irreconcileable conflict
on the question whether or not the unregistered transferee is pro-
tected in his purchase. The courts of eleven states of the union,
including the courts of Iowa, Illinois, California, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, and the United States Circuit Court in Johnson v. Laflin,
io3 U. S., 8oo, have held that an unregistered assignment of cor-
porate shares is not good as against an attaching creditor of the
assignor. This view is based, in some cases, on express statutory
enactments, Isbell v. Graybil, 19 Col. App., 5o8; in others on
implications in the statutes, requiring the transfers to be recorded
on the books of the corporation, Central National Bank v. Willis-
ton, 138 Mass., 244; while a third class base. their doctrine on
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the theory that a statute, requiring the transfer to be made on the
books of the company, is in the nature of a recording act, and is
for the benefit of the public as well as the corporation, Ft. Madi-
soU Lumber Co. v. Bataziona Bank, 71 Iowa, 370.
On the other hand, a slightly larger number of the- courts, in
absence of a statute making the registry of the transfer on the
books of the company a condition precedent to the completion of
a sale of the stock, hold that an unrecorded transfer is not affected
by a subsequent attachment, or execution levied on it by a cred-
itor of the transferor. The courts of Delaware, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Louisiana, Mississippi, West Virginia, Texas, Ten-
nessee, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Missouri, and the
federal courts take this view, and hold that in absence of a
statutory provision requiring that an assignment be entered on the
books of the company to effect a sale, a purchaser, in the absence
of fraud, takes the legal title upon the assignment of the stock.
Everett v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 117 N. W., 4or ; Cook
on Corporations (Sect. 486) says "the better rule and the rule that
will ultimately prevail is, that an unrecorded transfer of stock is,
in this respect, like an unrecorded deed of land, and gives title
as against subsequent attachments or executions, even though the
latter are levied in ignorance of the unrecorded transfer or deed."
The rule that he who purchases a certificate of stock for a valu-
able consideration is protected in his ownership of the stock, and
is not affected by a subsequent attachment or execution levied
on such stock for the debts of the registered stockholder, is
based on the grounds that the statutes requiring the registry of
the stock, are not in their nature public recording acts, but are
for the benefit of the corporation and the purchaser, and not for
the benefit of creditors of the stockholder. Thurber v. Crump,
89 Ky., 408. A review of the following cases will show that it
is the opinions of the courts that a transfer by assignment of
certificates leaves nothing in the assignor which can be reached
by a subsequent attachment or execution, although the stock re-
mains in his name on the books of the corporation, and that it is
immaterial that the by-laws or rules of the corporation require
the transfer to be made on its books: Bald-win v. Canfield, 26
Minn., 43; State Insurance Co. v. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch., 166;
Lipscom v. Cendon, 56 W. Va., 416; Mapleton Bank v. Stan-wood,
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8 Idaho, 740; Gilbert v. Manchester Iron Mfg. Co., ii Wend.
(N. Y.), 625.
From a consideration of tht foregoing authorities, the better
rule would seem to be that where the governing statute does not
attempt to raise the books of the corporation to the dignity of
public registration documents, and does not, by express terms, or
by implication, make a transfer on the boqks of the corporation
necessary to effect a sale of the stock, the fact that such transfer
has not been made, will not give an attaching creditor of the
transferor, priority over the rights of his transferee.
